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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court recently alarmed civil libertarians1 by diluting
the degree of protection that the government must guarantee an indi-
vidual when it compels him to testify. The Court has long held that
the government may require an individual to testify without violating
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination so long as the
witness is assured adequate immunity.2 Until recently, the minimum
necessary protection was thought to be "transactional" immunity,
under which the government was entirely barred from prosecuting an
individual for any "transaction, matter or thing"'3 as to which he
testified. Last term, however, in Kastigar v. United States4 and Zica-
relli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation5 the Court de-
termined that a less stringent rule-"use-plus-fruits" immunity0-is
constitutionally sufficient.- This standard permits the government to
prosecute a witness, but precludes using either the compelled testi-
mony or any information derived therefrom against him at trial.
Kastigar may well have been correctly decided, the libertarians'
alarm notwithstanding. But the decision's ultimate effect will depend
on the actual content given the use-plus-fruits immunity rule. The
fundamental issue is whether an exclusionary rule can be formulated
1. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1972, at 28, col. 4; id., May 24, 1972, at 28, cols. 3.6; id., May
28, 1972, § E, at 6, cols. 4-6.
2. This proposition was first agreed to by a badly split Court in Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1896). It was reaffirmed as recently as 1956 in Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, over the dissents of only two Justices.
3. The phrase commonly used in transactional immunity statutes. See, e.g.. Im-
munity Act of 1954, c.769, 68 Stat. 745.
4. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Petitioners had been found in contempt of court and in-
carcerated for refusing to testify before a federal grand jury despite a grant of im-
munity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970). The Supreme Court upheld the contempt
finding.
5. 406 U.S. 472 (1972). Zicarelli, a reputed major undenorld figure, declined to
answer certain questions before the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation despite
a grant of immunity pursuant to the applicable state law, N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:9M.17(b)
(1970). A finding of contempt was upheld by New Jersey's highest court. 55 N.J. 249,
261 A.2d 129 (1970). The Supreme Court affirmed.
6. Use-plus-fruits immunity is also commonly referred to as "testimonial" or "use
and derived use" immunity.
7. The Court divided in both cases five-two. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Blackmun were joined by Justices White and Stewart to form the majority.
Justices Douglas and Marshall dissented.
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that will fully protect an individual's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. If so, transactional immunity is wastefully broad in sacrificing the
possibility of prosecuting known wrongdoers on independent evidence.
If not, only a transactional rule will suffice. This Note will contend
that an adequate "use-plus-fruits" exclusionary rule can be formu-
lated, and will suggest specific guidelines for such a standard.
II. The Path to Kastigar and Zicarelli8
The Supreme Court first considered an immunity statute in Coln-
selman v. Hitchcock, in which it held that the immunity provided
was insufficient because the statute only prevented introduction of
the compelled testimony in a subsequent prosecution of the witness;
protection was not provided against such other uses as employing the
privileged testimony to lead to new evidence which might be presented
at trial. 10 In its opinion the Court then went on to announce that
[n]o statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecu-
tion after he answers the criminating question put to him, can
have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Con-
stitution of the United States."
As a result of these words, Counselman was generally assumed to
have established a transactional immunity rule. In subsequent cases,
however, the Court was never squarely presented with the question of
whether only transactional immunity is constitutionally sufficient.12
In 1964, the Court's decision in Malloy v. Hogan,13 applying the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, indirectly raised new immunity questions. The
states would henceforth be required to grant immunity from future
prosecution when compelling testimony. It thus became important to
8. For a more detailed review of historical matters see Note, Witness Imnmunity
Statutes: The Constitutional and Functional Sufficiency of "Use Immunity," 51 B.U.L.
REV. 616 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note, Witness Immunity Statutes]. See also Note,
Immunity Statutes and the Constitution, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1968); Note, Imuunity,
the Dilemma of Transactional versus Use, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 109 (1972); Comment, int-
munity From Prosecution: Transactional versus Testimonial or Use, 17 S. DAK. L. REV.
166 (1972); 24 VAND. L. REV. 815 (1971).
9. 142 US. 547 (1892).
10. Id. at 564.
11. Id. at 585.
12. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949); Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1 (1948); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Heike v. United States,
227 U.S. 131 (1913).
13. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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determine the effect such an immunity grant would have on future
federal prosecutions. If the federal government were left free to prose-
cute on the basis of testimony compelled by the state, the witness's
Fifth Amendment rights would become a sham. Yet if transactional
immunity were required, and a state's grant of immunity were binding
on the federal government, then the state would be able to prevent
the federal government from prosecuting for violation of federal stat-
utes, a result that arguably would violate the Supremacy Clause.'4
The Court resolved the problem with its decision in Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission,15 announced the same day as Malloy. Justice
Goldberg's majority opinion held that a grant of immunity in one
jurisdiction is binding on other jurisdictions as well. But it also held
that where the prosecuting jurisdiction is different from the one in
which the testimony was compelled, use-plus-fruits immunity is suf-
ficient.' 6 This approach assured that the witness could not be stripped
of his privilege against self-incrimination by being whipsawed between
jurisdictions. Yet it also denied the states the effective power to pre-
vent federal prosecution on the basis of independent evidence."-
Although Murphy clearly settled the inter-jurisdictional case, in
the years immediately following the Court seemed uncertain as to the
effect of its holding in cases where the questioning and prosecuting
jurisdiction were the same.' 8 Ultimately, however, the Warren Court
14. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905), indicated that a "state (immunity] statute
could not, of course, prevent a prosecution of the same part), under the United States
statute." Id. at 380. Accord, Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944); United
States v. Interborough Delicatessen Dealers Ass'n, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Cabot v. Corcoran, 332 Mass. 44, 123 N.E.2d 221 (1954). See also 8 WIGoM , EVIDENCE
§ 2258(2) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Note that the problem does not exist in the reverse direction. The federal immunity
statutes have always been interpreted to bar future state prosecution as well. Reina v.
United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Adams
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
15. 278 U.S. 52 (1964).
16. 378 U.S. at 79. Another alternative would have been simply to prevent the
states from compelling testimony whenever a federal statute might be involved. Given
the broad ovirlap of state and federal law, however, that approach would have severely
hampered the states' ability to investigate.
17. Justice Goldberg's opinion alludes only vaguely to the federalism problem. 378
U.S. at 71, 79. Justice White's concurrence is more explicit in confronting the issue:
"[I]f the witness is faced with prosecution by the Federal Government, the State is
powerless to extend immunity from prosecution under federal law in order to compel
testimony." Id. at 97. It has since been generally assumed that the Murphy decision
was in part a response to the problem of federalism. See Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 464 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 561,
566-67 (1971) (cert. dismissed as improvidently granted) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. In Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965). the
Court quoted Counselman's absolute immunity language with approval although its
objection to the statute in question seemed to be only that use was not barred. Id. at
80. In Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234 (1965), Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart,
suggested in a concurrence that in light of Malloy and Murphy the question of the
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indicated that it was moving toward full acceptance of a general
use-plus-fruits standard. 9 These signs were not lost on Congress. Title
II of the Organized Crime Control Act of 197020 repealed the existing
federal immunity statutes, almost all transactional, and substituted a
uniform use-plus-fruits rule.2 1 It was this Act that forced the Court's
hand and whose constitutionality was upheld in Kastigar.
Much of Justice Powell's majority opinion in Kastigar is devoted to
the argument that prior decisions in the immunity area provide prece-
dent for the constitutionality of a general use-plus-fruits standard.22 As
the discussion above suggests, this position has some justification, but it
is hardly inescapable.2 3 Prior decisions simply never addressed the issue
directly.
required intra-jurisdictional immunity should be fully briefed and argued. Id. at 249.
The lower courts and commentators were equally confused. Compare United States
ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 42-44 (3d Cir. 1971); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32,
37-38 (7th Cir. 1971); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note, Counsel-
man, Malloy, Murphy and the State's Power to Grant Immunity, 20 RtrrCERs L. REV.
336, 343 (1966); Note, Federalism and the Fifth: Configurations of Grants of Immunity,
12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 561, 577-78 (1965); with Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954,
956-57 (9th Cir. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972);
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129 (1970),
aff'd, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Note, Witness Immunity Statutes, supra note 8, at 632.
19. For example, in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), Justice Fortas, in
dictum in the course of the majority opinion, stated his full acceptance of use.plos-
fruits immunity in intra-jurisdictional cases. Id. at 276. In the same year, in Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, found
the government's argument for an implied use-plus-fruits restriction to a federal regis-
tration statute "in principle an attractive and apparently practical" solution, id. at 58,
although he ultimately rejected it on other grounds.
A full-scale attempt to justify a continued requirement for transactional immunity
intra-jurisdictionally was made by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Piccirillo v. New
York, 400 U.S. 548, 552 (1971) (cert. dismissed as improvidently granted). His chief con-
cern was that a much greater threat of unauthorized, untraceable transfers of inforina-
tion between investigator and prosecutor is inevitable where only a single goverii-
ment is involved. But the basis of Justice Brennan's position, that the danger Is suf-
ficiently greater within a single jurisdiction to require a stricter constitutional standard,
is open to doubt. Today, joint operations of law enforcement agencies regularly cut
across county and state lines. See generally THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: TIlE POLICE ch. 4 (1967).
A recent example of inter-jurisdictional cooperation is the series of coordinated drug
raids carried out by police in the metropolitan New York area supervised by the multi-
state Regional Narcotics Task Force. For the details of one such series of raids see
N.Y. Times, May 25. 1972, at I, col. 1. As these multi-governmental operations becomecommonplace, the same dangers of undisclo tesent in thc Inter-Juris-
dictional case as well. As a result, there must be adequate protection for the individual
prosecuted by a governmental unit different from the one which questioned hin.
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1970).
21. The new statute reads in part:
[N]o testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any informa-
tion directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may
be used against the witness in any criminal case ....
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
22. 406 U.S. 441, 448-59 (1972). The opinion stresses particularly that the logic of
Counselman requires only the barring of compelled testimony and its fruits. The state-
ment in that case suggesting transactional immunity is dismissed as unnecessary dictu.
23. Justice Douglas' dissent is devoted in large part to criticism of Justice Powell's
reading of the precedents. Id. at 462-67.
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Unfortunately, Justice Powell adds little discussion of his own con-
cerning the competing merits of a transactional and a testimonial rule.
In particular, he fails to suggest the specific content of an exclusionary
rule implementing use-plus-fruits immunity which will guarantee pro-
tection of the individual's Fifth Amendment privilege.2 4
III. Existing Exclusionary Rules
A. The Analogy to Coerced Confessions
The starting point in formulating an exclusionary rule for use-plus-
fruits immunity is the majority opinion in Murphy v. Walerfront Com-
mission. In an important footnote, the Court places the burden on the
government to prove "an independent, legitimate source"2 for its
evidence in prosecuting a person previously compelled to testify in
exchange for immunity. The majority opinion in Kastigar reaffirms
Murphy on this issue.2 Yet neither Murphy nor Kastigar provides
standards that the government must meet in sustaining its burden.
The Kastigar opinion draws an analogy to the use of an exclusionary
rule in coerced confession cases, also involving the privilege against
self-:incrimination,27 in support of its holding that an exclusionary rule
is adequate when immunity is granted.28 In the absence of any other
discussion of appropriate standards, the opinion's reliance on this
analogy suggests that the same exclusionary rule presently applied in
coerced confession cases should be extended to situations where testi-
mony has been compelled under immunity.2 Closer consideration,
however, indicates that the existing coerced confession exclusionary
rule would be inadequate in the immunity area for two reasons: first,
because that rule is presently too weak even for coerced confession
cases, and second, because any rule appropriate for coerced confessions
would still be insufficient in immunity grant cases as a result of impor-
tant differences in the circumstances involved.
24. See id. at 460-62.
25. 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
26. 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
27. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966); Malloy' v. Hogan. 378 U.S. 1,
7 (1964); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
28. 406 U.S. at 461-62.
29. In fact, Justice Powell's brief discussion of the issue gives some indication that
if the rules diverge at all a stricter standard may be required for coerced confes.
sions, since he asserts that
Moreover a defendant against whom incriminating evidence has been obtained
through a grant of immunity may be in a stronger position at trial than a defendant
who asserts a Fifth Amendment coerced-confession claim.
Id. at 461.
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B. The Relevance of the Fourth Amendment
It has long been established that a coerced confession cannot be
introduced in evidence against the individual who gave it.30 But only
recently, in Harrison v. United States,3' has the Court explicitly held
that additional evidence or information derived from a coerced con-
fession-that is, the "fruits"-must also be excluded. In applying this
holding to the facts in Harrison, the Court adopted the language it
had frequently used before to characterize the exclusionary rule ap-
plied in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases.32 As a result,
it appears that the latter rule has been transplanted intact to coerced
confession cases as well.
The Fourth Amendment rule, however, is inadequate to meet the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment. In practice, the Harrison word-
ing permits the fruits of coerced confessions, in diverse forms, to be
introduced at trial. It thus fails to provide sufficient protection against
such derivative uses.33
By equating the rules to be applied in the two cases, the Court in
Harrison appears to ignore critical distinctions between the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments-distinctions which it has clearly recognized
in previous opinions. The Fourth Amendment is aimed primarily at
protection of privacy.3 4 Exclusion of evidence obtained through an
30. No matter what standard the Court has adopted for determining whether a
confession is valid, the penalty for violating its existing rule has been exclusion of
the confession and its fruits, not a bar on subsequent prosecution. Jackson V. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 394 (1964). Thus, exclusion was required in Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936), where actual torture had taken place, just as it was in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), where a man was interrogated without being informed
of his constitutional rights. See also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Wan v.
United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
31. 392 U.S. 219 (1968). The question in the case was whether petitioner's testimony
in a previous trial, given after confessions later determined to have been coerced were
admitted, was "the inadmissible fruit of the illegally procured confessions." Id. at 221.
32. The Court used the Fourth Amendment rule as expressed in Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), in finding that the petitioner's testimony had not
been shown to have been "obtained 'by means sufficiently distinguishable' from the
underlying illegalities 'to be purged of the primary taint'." 392 U.S. at 226, quoting
Wong Sun v. United States, supra at 488.
33. Another distressing feature of the coerced confession rule as presently developed
is its willingness to allow, at least in some circumstances, the use of an illegally ob.
tained confession in a subsequent prosecution to impeach the testimony of tle In.
dividual from whom it was received. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Dershowltz
& Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971), worriedly suggests that it is a
short step from this position to holding that testimony obtained tinder immunity iiay
be similarly used for impeachment in a subsequent prosecution. Id. at 1223.
34. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . .. ... U.S. CoNsT.
amend. IV.
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illegal search cannot remedy the constitutional violation.35 Rather,
the object of an exclusionary rule in such cases is to deter future police
misconduct "by removing the incentive to disregard" 30 the constitu-
tional guarantee.3- Hence, the Court has reasoned that exclusion of
evidence makes sense only if the link between the evidence and the
illegal act is concrete enough so that the police can appreciate the
disadvantage to which their conduct put the government in prosecut-
ing the victim.38
In contrast, the primary purpose of the Fifth Amendment privilege
is to avoid forcing an individual to contribute to the imposition of
criminal penalties upon himself,3 9 not to protect his privacy.40 Com-
35. Thus presumably, unlike the Fifth Amendment case, the legislature could not
authorize the police to search persons' homes without probable cause even if such
searches were accompanied by a broad grant of immunity.
36. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). In Tehan v. United States
ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), the Court asserted even more emphatically that the
"single and distinct 'purpose"" of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter
future unconstitutional police conduct. Id. at 413. But see note 37 infra.
37. While the Court held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). that the eclusionary
rule for the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally required, id. at 635. it is unclear
whether that result was reached because the exclusionary rule is the only effective
way to deter violation of the rights involved, see id. at 656, or because illegally seized
evidence is unconstitutional of itself, see id. at 635-56. Arguably Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965), by refusing to apply Mapp retroactively, resolved that the former
view is correct. See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 -Lrav. L. REV. 63, 218 n.19(1968). If that is the case, then it might be possible to replace the exclusionary rnle.
if more effective means were found to deter police conduct, and authorize admis-
sion of evidence seized in illegal searches. In the Fifth Amendment context, in con-
trast, an attempt to authorize the admission of tainted evidence in a prosecution of the
person from whom it was obtained would clearly be unconstitutional tinder an) condi.
tions. See note 39 infra.
38. Thus, evidence may be introduced if its connection with the privileged e idence
has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 491 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); see also Harrison
v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 231 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 l-Lnv. L. REv. 63, 221-22
(1968). This "attenuation doctrine" has occasionally been the subject of severe criticism.
See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REV. 935, 1024-25 (1916).
39. "The design of the constitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in vindicating
his character, but to protect him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict
him of a criminal charge." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896). This proposition
was reaffirmed in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), where the Court stated
that "the sole concern" of the privilege is "the danger to a witness forced to give testi-
mony leading to the infliction of 'penalties affixed to criminal statutes'...." Id. at 438,
quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). The two dissenters, Justices
Black and Douglas, took a much broader view of what the Fifth Amendment protected
than did the majority. They argued that immunity could not proteet an individual's
conscience, dignity, and freedom of expression, or prevent him from being subject to
infamy and disgrace. Id. at 440 (Douglas, J., dissenting). By 1972, only Justice Douglas
still contended that "the framers put it beyond the power of Congress to conpel an)one
to confess his crimes." Kastigar v. United States. 406 US. 441, 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original). See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 US. 441, 453; The Supreme
Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63, 222 (1968); Note, Immunity Statutes and the Con-
stitution, 68 CoLust. L. REV. 959, 964 (1968).
40. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments do overlap to some extent. The complex of
values from which the Fifth Amendment arose included considerations of pri~acy.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). Similarly, the Fourth Amend-
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pelling an individual to give information against his will, even if that
information is self-incriminating, is not a constitutional violation per
se. If the rule were otherwise, no immunity statute would be con-
stitutional.4' Rather, the Fifth Amendment simply requires that, if
testimony is compelled, the witness must be secure from the possi-
bility that he will be confronted at trial with information obtained as
a result. Thus, unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment
is directly concerned with the introduction of tainted evidence at trial;
it is in fact the introduction of such evidence that constitutes the pri-
mary violation of the Amendment. Even if the exclusion of evidence
derived from a coerced confession is unlikely to have a deterrent effect
on the police, its introduction will still represent an infringement on
the individual's privilege against self-incrimination. 42
C. Coerced Confessions Compared to Immunity Grants
As the preceding section shows, an exclusionary rule developed for
Fourth Amendment cases does not provide protection sufficient to
accomplish the purpose of the Fifth Amendment. Even if a rule appro-
priate for coerced confessions were adopted, 43 however, it would still
be inadequate for immunity grants.
As Justice Marshall points out in his dissent in Kastigar,44 some
important distinctions can be drawn between the circumstances sur-
rounding coerced' confessions and those surrounding the compulsion
ment violation of privacy is compounded when privileged evidence is introduced in
open court. As the Court noted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), "the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments . . . enjoy an 'intimate relation' in their perpetuation of 'principles
of humanity and civil liberty' .... Id. at 657 (footnotes omitted). But in each case, as
the language of the Amendments themselves and the cases discussed above indicate, see
notes 34-39 supra, a separate primary purpose stands out.
41. See note 2 supra.
42. Thus, the attenuation doctrine is inappropriate in Fifth Amendment cases. See
Pitier, "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. Rav. 579
620 (1968); Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 935, 1028 n.21
(1966).
That some confusion on this issue still exists is evidenced by Justice White's dissent
in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 228 (1968):
When one deals with the fruits of an illegal search or seizure, as in Silverthorne, or
with the fruits of an illegal confession, as the Court decides that we do in this case,
the reason for suppression of the original illegal evidence itself is prophylactic-to
deter the police from engaging in such conduct in the future by denying them its past
benefits.
Id. at 231 (footnote omitted). See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488.89 (1970).
43. Perhaps because in both the search and seizure and coerced confession cases the
initial factor is police misconduct, the distinctions between the two situations have
generally been neglected. Now that the immunity grant issue has forced attention to
focus on the special considerations applicable to exclusionary rules in the Fifth Amend.
ment context, however, it is to be hoped that the courts will turn their attention as
well to the need for a better-developed rule for coerced confessions.
44. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 467 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of testimony under a grant of immunity. In the coerced confession
case, the evidentiary rule is applied after the interrogation has oc-
curred, not before as with a grant of immunity. Furthermore, the de-
cision to interrogate is made by a policeman who is without substan-
tial legal training, and who is often acting in haste and under pressure.
When testimony is compelled under a grant of immunity, in contrast,
the entire proceeding is in the hands of a prosecutor who is a lawyer,
and who has ample time to consider the appropriate course of action.
Finally, while there can be no mistaking the act of granting immunity,
it is not always clear what constitutes a coerced confession. The
Supreme Court has periodically revised its definitions in this area,
often relying on subtle distinctions which, even if known by a police-
man, may be difficult for him to apply in any given case. These con-
siderations are important in formulating an appropriate exclusionary
rule for each situation.
A rule which seeks to protect individual rights must be drawn with
an awareness of its cost to society as well as its effectiveness in pro-
tecting the personal privilege. The goal should be to frame a standard
which maximizes the latter while minimizing the former. Where these
dual objectives necessarily conflict, a proper balance between them
must be sought.45 The question is: Should the rule employed to
achieve the preferred social balance be different for coerced con-
fessions than for immunity grants?
Degree of Protection. Any given rule, whether exclusionary or trans-
actional, will provide roughly equivalent protection for the individ-
ual's privilege when applied to the two types of cases. The Fifth
Amendment simply requires that an individual not be confronted at
trial with evidence derived from privileged information. Whether that
information was obtained by coercing a confession or by compelling
testimony will have little effect on the protection a rule affords against
its use.40
45. Such balancing, rather than an absolutist approach, has always been characteristic
of the Court's decisions in the Fifth Amendment area. Any prosecution after a confession
has been coerced or testimony has been compelled, whether that prosecution is for a
matter directly covered by the interrogation or not, involves some danger that tainted
evidence will be introduced. The Court, however, has never suggested that a person
must be free from all future prosecution whatsoever after such interrogation has taken
place. Rather, in the immunity area, at most it has barred subsequent prosecution for
the same transaction, see p. 171 supra, and in the coerced confession area has simply
employed a relatively weak exclusionary rule, see p. 176 supra.
46. Distinguishing between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is essential here. If
the prevention of illegal police conduct in coercing confessions were the primary con-
cera of the Fifth Amendment, then the effectiveness of a rule as a deterrent would
be an appropriate consideration. In that context, it would be relevant whether the rule
were to be applied before or after the event, whether the decision to obtain informa-
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Cost to Society. On the other hand, the cost to society exacted by a
given rule will be considerably higher when applied to coerced con-
fessions than when employed in the immunity grant case, since such
costs are likely to be much lower when the rule is applied to a prosecu-
tor than when enforced against a policeman. The prosecutor is in a good
position to determine the possible costs. Presumably, he will grant
immunity only when he is sure the information is worth more to society
than the reduced chance of the witness's conviction. In addition, a
prosecutor can be expected to take all steps necessary prior to granting
immunity to insure that the cost is at a minimum. For example, he
may compel only specifically required information in order to keep the
resulting exclusion or immunity as narrow as possible. A policeman,
on the other hand, is less likely to realize the impact of his actions on
the government's case in a subsequent trial, and is therefore not in
as good a position to consider whether an individual's information is
worth more to society than his conviction. 47 He is less likely to take
steps before and during coercion of a confession to minimize its cost.48
In sum, any given rule, applied to both confessions and immunity
grants, will provide roughly the same degree of protection for the indi-
vidual's privilege but will exact higher societal costs in the coerced
tion would generally be made in haste and under difficult circumstances, and whether
the individuals who would usually be making the decisions were trained in the law.
Instead, however, a Fifth Amendment rule is appropriately judged by Its success in In-
suring that privileged information is not used against an individual at trial. None of
these distinctions affects the ability of a given transactional or testimonial rule to
accomplish that goal.
It should also be noted that even if deterrence were a factor, a more stringent rule
still would be appropriate in the immunity case as compared to the confession case.
The differences pointed out above suggest that a policeman is much less likely to be
deterred by a strict rule than a prosecutor, whether because of lack of training or of
time for adequate consideration. It is also possible that he simply will not care that
the prosecution will be put at a disadvantage at trial as long as he has the satisfaction
of solving the case by obtaining a confession and of applying his own informal sanctions.
See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sul,. Cr.
REV. 1, 39.
47. The significance of these factors, however, should not be overestimated. The
state has the opportunity to select and train its policemen to ensure that they know when
their actions are unauthorized. It is also capable of providing substantial deterrence to
prevent the police from performing illegal acts. Thus, the state may be able to minll.
mize or avoid costs in the coerced confession case as well. In fact, too reat a difference
between the standard for coerced confessions and that for immunity grants mlight
actually encourage the authorities to employ illegal means of obtaining privileged i-
formation rather than legal ones because of the lesser costs involved.
48. A similar argument focuses on more symbolic considerations. The legislature, more
than any other institution, is the embodiment of the society. Where the legislature has
authorized compulsion of testimony despite the privilege against self-incrimination, the
decision is properly viewed as one made by the society, the full cost of which it should
bear. A local policeman who coerces a confession, on the other hand, is probably acting
contrary to established rules. It is much less clear that society as a whole should be
held as strictly accountable for this sort of unauthorized action by one of its lower
level officials.
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confession case. Thus, in order to strike the same preferred social bal-
ance, a stricter rule is necessary when testimony is compelled underimmunity. This analysis, however, can only determine the comparative
strictness appropriate for rules dealing with the two situations. The
specific content of the immunity rule is the next subject of inquiry.
IV. A Proposed Exclusionary Rule
A. Objective Standards
A witness who has been compelled to testify is at a distinct disad-
vantage in a subsequent prosecution, regardless of the burden of proof
on the government. As Judge Motley observed in her opinion in In re
Kinoy:49
To say a witness can successfully rebut the Government's proof
that its source is untainted is to be naive about the imbalance
which daily attends the resources of Government as opposed to
those of an average defendant in a criminal case.' 0
The prosecution is likely to have exclusive knowledge of the original
sources of its evidence.5 1 While discovery may be of some assistance,
particularly under a liberal provision like Federal Rule 16,52 no de-
fendant will be allowed the unrestricted access to the prosecutor's
files necessary to be sure that the independent source claimed is legiti-
mate. 53 No one, moreover, can accurately estimate the subjective effect
of knowledge of the witness's guilt on the investigators' zeal in pur-
suing new evidence. And a prosecutor may not even be aware of an
unauthorized use of privileged information by an employee "in the
depths of his investigative process."5 4
What is needed is a set of adequate objective standards which must
be met by the government before a court will accept evidence as un-
tainted in a subsequent prosecution. A subjective formulation of the
Murphy burden of proof standard-whether "preponderance of the
evidence," "clear and convincing," or "beyond a reasonable doubt"-
49. 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
50. Id. at 419.
51. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
Note, Witness Immunity Statutes, supra note 8. at 659; Note, In re Koota: Tile Scope o
Immunity Statutes, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 654, 663-66 (1966).
52. FED. R. CPRM. P. 16.
53. See Note, Witness Immunity Statutes, supra note 8, at 659.
54. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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will not alone provide a "reliable guarantee" of a witness's privilege.
The following standards are proposed to comprise an exclusionary
rule insuring that the government bears its burden in establishing an
"independent, legitimate source."50 ;
1. In prosecuting an individual for a matter concerning which he
has previously been compelled to testify under a grant of immunity,
the government will be confined to evidence which was certified by
the court before the testimony was compelled. Under this standard,
if a prosecutor wishes to maintain the possibility of a future indict-
ment of a witness for a matter as to which he will be testifying, all
evidence that he has in hand before the grant of immunity must be
reduced to certifiable form. This procedure would involve a detailed
affidavit by the prosecutor as to the offenses charged and the evidence
he presently holds, together with documents to support his claims.
Included would be depositions or affidavits of all witnesses, photo-
graphs of items of physical evidence, and copies of all records and
medical or laboratory reports.5 7 The complete report would be filed
with the court from which the immunity grant was requested as part
of the petitioning procedure. 58 Although the report would be held in
strict confidence, the court could require a closed hearing to clarify
any uncertainties in the report as to what evidence the government
actually holds. In a subsequent trial, the prosecution would be limited
to evidence certified in the filed report.50 If the prosecutor did not file
such a report, all evidence presented by the government in a later
prosecution for a matter touched upon by the witness's testimony
would irrebutedly be presumed tainted and thus be inadmissible.
2. Before granting immunity to a witness, a prosecutor must notify
other jurisdictions that might wish to prosecute the individual for
55. Id. at 468-69.
56. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n. 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
57. These procedures, if not applied reasonably, could obviously put an intolerable
burden on prosecutors. For example, a full deposition of every potential witness before
granting immunity would probably be impossible given the government's limited re.
sources in terms of time and personnel. At a minimum, however, a detailed affidavit
from the witnesses would be necessary. In general, the courts would be relied upon to
exercise good judgment in developing certification procedures consistent with pro.
tection of a witness's rights.
58. The present federal immunity statute requires that the United States attorney
for a district, after obtaining approval from the Attorney General, must request that
the district court grant immunity for a witness when he judges it to be warranted. 18
U.S.C. § 6003 (1970). For a discussion of special cases involving congressional committees
and federal agencies see note 62 infra.
59. Close questions would necessarily arise as to whether answers sought or evidence
presented were included in the certified report. A strict burden of proof should be
placed on the government to demonstrate that the evidence it presents was actually
certified. Such a presumption against the state would guarantee that, if a prosecutor
desired to keep open the option of prosecuting, he would be careful during certification.
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related matters and, upon their request, provide them with the oppor-
tunity to reduce their evidence to certifiable form. Whether later in-
dictment were contemplated or not, the prosecutor would be required
to check with the National Crime Information Center 60 for information
on the individual, including outstanding warrants. On the basis of the
reply from the NCIC and other available facts, including biographical
information, the questioning authorities would have to notify any
other jurisdiction that might be interested in the individual of its
intention to grant immunity. A minimum waiting period after noti-
fication had been sent (perhaps two weeks) would be mandatory
before immunity could be granted. If any other jurisdiction indicated
that it intended to prosecute the witness, consideration would have to
be given to its interests. At a minimum the questioning jurisdiction
would have to allow time for other prosecutors to reduce their evi-
dence to certifiable form."1 Only after this notification procedure was
satisfactorily completed would a court grant immunity.102
3. In a subsequent prosecution of a witness for matters as to which
he has testified, jurisdictions other than that which originally granted
immunity will also be barred from introducing evidence not certified
prior to the witness's testimony. As standard 2 implies, other juris-
dictions w6uld be held to the same evidentiary restrictions as the ques-
tioning sovereign in any subsequent prosecution of the witness for
60. The National Crime Information Center (,'.CIC) is a central crime data storage
system operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with inputs from law enforce-
ment agencies throughout the country. Along with information on stolen vehiclLs, guns
and other articles with identification numbers, it holds names of persons wainted for
felony offenses. The relevant criteria for these wanted listings are that jtudicial process
must be outstanding and the state or city must be willing to seek the extradition of
the individual in order to prosecute him. As of July 1, 1972, 114,306 nted indihiduals
were listed. In addition, 162,290 computerized criminal histories were contained in the
bank. These records for previous offenders are accompanied by court disposition sheets
for each charge recorded against them.
This information is readily available to police departments throughout the countr).
There is at least one major link with the system in each state. Local departments in
turn are connected to the state authority in contact wih NCIC. Local officials thus
are able to obtain information from NCIC within a few seconds. Ready accoss to the
system is indicated by its heavy use: in June 1972. the network handled 2,.722. 60
separate requests. Conversation with Agent John Rikes, San Francisco Office, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, in San Francisco, Aug. 24, 1972.
61. More drastic steps might include establishing a priority schedule among crimes.
Any jurisdiction which sought to grant a witness immunity with respect to certain
matters might be barred from doing so if another jurisdiction indicated that it intended
to prosecute for a "more serious" violation. Such matters of priority. however, seem
better left to the discretion of the authorities involved in each particular case.
62. The notification procedure has some inherent limitations. Such factors as use
of new aliases, failure or delay in filing warrants with NCIC, and the absence of a
warrant in a case where investigation is still proceeding, mean that the information ob-
tained from NCIC will necessarily be of limited usefulness. Offsetting these drawbacks,
however, is the probability that the authorities seeking the compelled testimony will
usually know which other jurisdictions might be interested in him as a result of
their own investigation of the witness.
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matters as to which he had testified. The only difference would be
that the prosecutor's report would be filed with the court in which
he expected to try his case rather than with the one granting immunity.
This standard would bind a jurisdiction whether in fact it had been
informed in advance of the immunity grant or not.
These standards, if adopted by the Court,03 would answer most of
the objections of the critics of use-plus-fruits immunity. An inde-
pendent source0 4 would be objectively verifiable. The defendant would
not need to rely on the prosecutor's good faith, nor depend on a neces-
sarily subjective judgment as to whether any of the investigatory per-
sonnel used or were influenced by the privileged testimony.0 5 The
prosecutor would be limited to presenting evidence that he held be-
fore the defendant was compelled to say a word.
These standards may at first seem overly harsh. They would pre-
clude the possibility of the prosecution continuing its investigation and
obtaining legitimately independent evidence. Such new evidence,
though untainted, would be barred at trial. Yet prior completion
is the only fully reliable- method of determining that evidence was
obtained independently of the privileged testimony. Otherwise, that
63. The procedure suggested may seem too detailed to be announced in a Supreme
Court opinion. Such a step by the Court, however, is not without precedent. For ex.
ample, the Court recently announced six quite specific "minimum requirements of due
process" for a parole revocation hearing. Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 260-4 (1972).
The standards established there are at least as detailed as those proposed here.
Standards 1, 3 and 4 could be made fully effective against both state and federal
governments by a Supreme Court decision. They would be mandated as the minimal
constitutional requirements necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege at trials
of individuals previously compelled to testify.
Standard 2, in contrast, is generally aimed not at protection of a constitutional right
but rather at the efficient administration of the criminal justice system. The notification
requirement has a constitutional justification in only one instance: States will be re-
quired to notify the U.S. Attorney General of their decision to grant immunity; otherwise
the federalism problem which Murphy avoided would reappear. See p. 173 supra. Aside
from this one exception, the Court's ability to require notification depends on Its ati-
thority to impose administrative rules. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216(1960); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943). Thus, wherever approval of
a federal judge is required for an immunity grant, mandatory notification of otherjurisdictions could be enforced. Under the present federal immunity statute, therefore,
the second standard could be imposed on United States attorneys and the Congress.
since both of them must petition for and receive an immunity grant from a federal
district judge for a witness compelled to testify. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6003, 6005 (1970). Federal
agencies, however, are now required to obtain only the approval of the Attorney General
to compel testimony under an immunity grant, 18 U.S.C. § 6004 (1970), and thus would
not be affected by an administrative rule announced by the Court. Imposition of the
notification requirement on them would require alteration of the present law by Congress.
At the state level, the Court also would be unable to impose its standard, beyond
requiring notification of the Attorney General. Reciprocal agreements by the states, how-
ever, to provide such notification among themselves would be likely.
64. The concern of Justices Brennan, Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568
(1970) (cert. dismissed as improvidently granted) (Brennan, J., dissenting), Marshall,
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 468 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and Douglas,
id. at 467 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting), as well as Judge Motley, In re Kinoy, 326 F.
Supp. 407, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
65. Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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distinction frequently would be impossible to make because of the
subjective factors discussed above.00
The inconvenience to the prosecution of completing its investigation
before trial would not be unreasonable. The government obtains dis-
tinct advantages from the information given under immunity as, for
example, when it wishes to make a solid case against other figures
involved in a crime, or to procure legislation. Ultimately, the specific
standards proposed might be of significant use to the government in
prosecuting witnesses who have previously been compelled to testify.
Without the standards, such prosecution would be virtually impossible
where the courts gave real meaning to the government's burden to
prove that it has used only independent evidence.0 7 With the standards,
the prosecutor has specific guidelines he may follow to convince any
court that his evidence is untainted.
The standards proposed here do not, however, go so far as to require
that the witness be tried, if at all, before immunity is granted. While
such a requirement might seem to follow logically from the concept
of protection by prior completion, offsetting time pressures must also
be considered. The information obtained by compelled testimony is
often essential to proceed in actions against other persons. To require
prior trial of the witness might entail significant delays, particularly
where more than one jurisdiction wished to prosecute. The result in
some cases could be unreasonably long periods of pretrial detention
for persons against whom the witness's testimony was to be used. It
would also be impossible to obtain quickly the privileged information
necessary for immediate moves in a fast developing situation without
eliminating the possibility of future prosecution of the witness. Such
a restriction seems unnecessary where the government already holds
evidence sufficient for the conviction of the witness which it can easily
place in certifiable form.
Yet one important problem remains: the possibility that the prose-
cutor may have access to the compelled testimony and use it in some
significant way short of introducing tainted evidence in a subsequent
trial. Such uses might include assistance in planning trial strategy,
interpreting the meaning of evidence, or planning cross-examination
if the defendant takes the stand. 8 One last requirement, therefore, is
proposed.
66. See p. 181 supra.
67. Note, Witness Immunity Statutes, supra note 8, at 664.
68. Concern with investigative or prosecutorial use resulting from access to a tran-
script of privileged statements has been the basis of the decision in one recent case and
of a concurrence in another. In United States v. McDaniel, 449 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1971).
the court reversed federal convictions for embezzlement, misappropriation of funds and
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4. The prosecutor in a trial of a witness who has previously testi-
fied under a grant of immunity must swear that he has not had access
to the privileged testimony or to any information derived from it.
Before beginning the trial of an individual previously compelled to
testify, the prosecutor would be required to swear that he had neither
seen a transcript of the privileged testimony nor been informed in any
way of its contents or of any information derived from it. Where cir-
cumstances precluded the possibility of total ignorance, the trial judge
on his own motion could disqualify the prosecutor without applying
the oath. Examples of such cases would include situations where the
privileged testimony had been given media coverage or where cases
involving evidence derived from the testimony of the accused had been
handled by the same office.
Even with this last rule, however, protection for the individual
would not be absolute. Many problems are of course involved in
relying on oaths of law enforcement officials. 9 One very real drawback
is the encouragement given to lying. Yet the oath involved here would
be limited in scope, and would often be subject to objective verifica.
tion. In some cases, as where a transcript had been formally obtained,
the truth could be easily determined. In most cases at least one other
person, the individual who supplied the information, would know the
facts. Given the small potential for obtaining advantage from the in-
making false entries in the records of a federally insured bank because the United States
attorney for the district had requested and received a transcript of the defendant's
testimony under an immunity grant before a state grand jury. The court held that
this conduct constituted a prima facie use of the privileged testimony. Id. at 837. Similarly
Chief Judge Seitz, in his concurrence in United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d
40, 45 (3d Cir. 1971), expressed his concern that the prosecutor would use privileged
testimony given under immunity to formulate his questions on cross.examinatlon If the
defendant elected to take the stand.
At least one commentator has argued that this type of use need not be prevented.
See Note, Witness Immunity Statutes, supra note 8, at 617-48. Drawing an analogy with
the Fourth Amendment case where the prosecutor is aware that the evidence sup.
pressed at trial was illegally obtained, the author argues that no broader remedy Is
required in the Fifth Amendment area. But this position fails to take account of the
distinctions between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments discussed at pp. 176.78 supra.
69. Broader use of prosecutors' oaths in this area has been suggested. One comn-
mentator proposes that a prosecutor's oath is the solution to the whole problem of
insuring independent evidence. Note, In re Koota: The Scope of Immunity Statutes, 61
Nw. U.L. Rav. 654, 655 (1966). Another calls for oaths by key investigatory personnel,
presumably including the prosecutor, as one of a series of procedures to avoid subse-
quent prosecutions that violate the privilege against self-incrimination. See Note, Witness
Immunity Statutes, supra note 8, at 662. There are, however, numerous problems with
relying on oaths. Among these are: the possibility that a law enforcement officer might
be unaware that he had informally received privileged information or that such in-
formation had been used by his subordinates; the difficulty of determining how much
an individual was affected in his investigation by the certainty of guilt; and the problem
of enforcement when investigation of a perjury charge will be conducted by fellow
officers within the same jurisdiction. Id.
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formation 0 and the very high cost if caught,7 1 most prosecutors would
not risk using tainted information. To be sure, an oath cannot pre-
clude the prosecutor from receiving information whose taint is un-
known to him. But in such a case the potential harm to the defendant
would be relatively small. The information transferred could not be
very extensive or significant if the prosecutor remained unaware of its
source. Furthermore, any tainted evidence so obtained could be put
only to limited use. Since it would not be certified before the immunity
grant, it could not be introduced at trial.
Even the transactional rule, supposedly absolute in its protection,
subjects a person to a similar threat to his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.72 A witness's compelled testimony may ultimately contribute
to his conviction for a crime other than the ones covered by the im-
munity grant. Once attention and investigation are focused on a per-
son's activities, other possible violations are more likely to come to light.
In fact, the so-called transactional standard is in effect only a particu-
larly strict form of exclusionary rule which regards all evidence as
tainted in any subsequent prosecution for matters covered in the
compelled testimony. It does not provide complete protection against
introduction of the tainted fruits of this testimony when the same
person is prosecuted for an unrelated matter.
B. Evaluating the Proposed Standards
The discussion in Part III indicated that a stricter standard of pro-
tection for individuals' rights is appropriate in the immunity grant
area than would be provided by either the present Fourth Amendment
rule or even an adequate coerced confession rule. Both transactional
immunity and the exclusionary rule proposed here provide such in-
creased protection. After Kastigar, transactional immunity is not avail-
able as a minimum constitutional standard. A strict exclusionary rule
still is. This factor alone suggests the value of this Note's proposed
standards. In addition, however, a comparison of the transactional
rule and the exclusionary rule proposed here, by the criteria estab-
lished earlier,73 suggests that the latter provides a superior balance be-
tween competing considerations.
With respect to the protection afforded the individual's privilege,
70. It could not be used as a source of new evidence because of standards 1 and 3.
71. Being caught in a lie could mean the end of a prosecutor's career. Conviction
of a perjury charge might well result in disbarment.
72. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956) (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
73. See p. 179 supra.
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the transactional rule and this Note's proposed rule are not significantly
different, though in some circumstances the transactional rule may
provide a slightly stronger safeguard against use of derived information
in a manner short of introduction as evidence3 4 But as to the other
consideration-cost to society-a more substantial difference exists. A
transactional rule entirely forecloses prosecution of an individual for
any matter as to which he has testified. The exclusionary rule pro-
posed here, on the other hand, permits prosecution as long as the
government can meet the objective criteria necessary to establish its
evidence as untainted. As a consequence, it reduces considerably any
interference with society's interest in prosecuting known wrongdoers.
Substantially higher costs to society should not be considered ob-
jectionable as long as they produce a significant, even though pro-
portionately smaller, increase in protection for the individual's Fifth
Amendment right. But penalizing society without corresponding gain
for the individual cannot be justified. The transactional immunity
rule, in comparison with this Note's rule, seems to do the latter. Al-
though it significantly increases the cost to society, it provides only
a marginal increase in protection for the individual's privilege.
V. Conclusion
The exclusionary rule proposed here would impose strict standards.
It provides, however, no more than the Constitution requires-immu-
nity "as broad as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the
privilege against self-incrimination."r 5
Kastigar's effect will be uncertain until the courts give content to
the exclusionary rule that accompanies it. If the rule conforms with
the standards suggested here, the holding may ultimately promote
prosecution of known wrongdoers without sacrificing individuals' con-
stitutional rights. If less stringent standards are adopted, however, the
libertarians' lamentations will have been well justified.
74. The problem of tainted information does not arise with a transactional rule
until a prosecution takes place for a matter as to which the accused has not been
compelled to testify. Under the standards proposed here, on the other hand, some
danger remains of such "secondary" use even in a prosecution for a matter as to
which the defendant previously testified.
75. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 107 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
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